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Abstract:
In an exploratory quasi-experimental observational study, 138 participants recruited during a university orienta-
tion week were exposed to social engineering directives in the form of fake email or phishing attacks over several
months in 2017. These email attacks attempted to elicit personal information from participants or entice them
into clicking links which may have been compromised in a real-world setting. The study aimed to determine the
risks of cybercrime for students by observing their responses to social engineering and exploring attitudes to cy-
bercrime risks before and after the phishing phase. Three types of scam emails were distributed that varied in the
degree of individualization: generic, tailored, and targeted or ‘spear.’ To differentiate participants on the basis of
cybercrime awareness, participants in a ‘Hunter’ condition were primed throughout the study to remain vigilant
to all scams, while participants in a ‘Passive’ condition received no such instruction. The study explored the influ-
ence of scam type, cybercrime awareness, gender, IT competence, and perceived Internet safety on susceptibility
to email scams. Contrary to the hypotheses, none of these factors were associated with scam susceptibility. Alt-
hough, tailored and individually crafted email scams were more likely to induce engagement than generic scams.
Analysis of all the variables showed that international students and first year students were deceived by signifi-
cantly more scams than domestic students and later year students. A Generalized Linear Model (GLM) analysis
was undertaken to further explore the role of all the variables of interest and the results were consistent with
the descriptive findings showing that student status (domestic compared to international) and year of study (first
year student compared to students in second, third and later years of study) had a higher association to the risk
of scam deception. Implications and future research directions are discussed.
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Introduction
As individuals become increasingly connected to the virtual world, the avenues through which cy-
bercriminals may exploit them likewise increase. Although developments in technology have attemp-
ted to mitigate these risks, human error continues to be the ‘weakest link’ in cyber security (Mayhorn,
Welk, Zielinska, & Murphy-Hill, 2015). When cybercriminals employ ‘spam,’ ‘phishing,’ or ‘spear phis-
hing’ methods in their attempts to hack, distribute malware, or steal personal information, they target
their victim’s judgment rather than their virtual security measures (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra,
& Ginther, 2018; Alazab &Broadhurst, 2016).
A common vector for distributing malware is spam email. Spam can involve harmless advertising
through unsolicited emails, SMS texts, or social network messages, but spam may also contain viruses
or malware designed to exploit personal or sensitive information from its recipients. Though spam
may seem insignificant at the individual level, estimates indicate that the world-wide average daily
volume of spam was approximately 422 billion in January 2018, constituting about 85 percent of all
daily global email traffic (Talos, 2018).
The widespread and ubiquitous threat of malware-borne spam poses significant economic and
social consequences, however, experiences of victimization and susceptibility are not universal. Pre-
vious studies have suggested that gender (Sun, Yu, Lin, & Tseng, 2016), age (Gavett et al., 2017), and
technical experience (Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & Butavicius, 2012) influence an indivi-
dual’s susceptibility to spam and phishing attempts. This study was designed to further explore how
these factors and others – namely the type of scam, cybercrime awareness, gender, and IT competence
– influenced cybercrime susceptibility amongst a sample of university students. To accomplish this,
research participants were exposed to various fake emails sent from the research team’s web server,
and their interactions with these scams were observed. Engaging university students offered the ad-
vantage of using a single institutional Internet service, which could also monitor real spam events,
and reduced ethical concerns associated with an open or public sample.
Literature: Factors Influencing Susceptibility
Broadly speaking, ‘spam’ encompasses all unsolicited electronic messages that are usually, but
not always, sent in bulk transmission. Composers of scam messages combine technology with social
engineering techniques in order to lure and deceive their victims into giving up sensitive information.
In short, these offenders engage in a ‘phishing’ deception by enticing a response through email. While
the purposes of phishing vary, it is often used to deliver malware, or ransomware, or to obtain personal
information from the recipient for the purpose of identity theft.
Chaudhry, Chaudhry, and Rittenhouse (2016) suggest a typical phishing attack is comprised of
three elements: a lure, a hook, and catch. The lure often involves an email message appearing to be
from a legitimate person or organization, the reliability of which is strengthened through the exploita-
tion of:
• Curiosity: such as emails containing compromised links which appear to lead to videos of recent
news or events;
• Fear: such as emails from the ‘bank’ urging users to validate their information due to account
breaches;
• Empathy: such as emails impersonating a friend or relative who is in need of financial assistance
or personal information.
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This list is not exhaustive and can be augmented by appeals to other emotions such as greed
(e.g., a winning lottery ticket), lust or vanity (e.g. an adoring admirer, a prestigious job opportunity).
De Kimpe, Walrave, Hardyns, Pauwels, and Ponnet (2018) list characteristics that can either facilitate
or hinder the success of phishing e-mails (e.g., the presence of spelling and design/format errors, mo-
netary prize offers). Once receivers are convinced the mail is authentic, the next stage is to convince
the recipients to divulge sensitive information. Various social manipulators such as liking or trusting
the email source; implicating reciprocity (e.g., returning favors) or ‘social proof ’ (i.e., others are par-
ticipating); creating a sense of scarcity or evoking an authoritative source will help the deception to
succeed.
When phishing emails make use of personalized data in their lures, they become examples of
‘spear phishing.’ Spear phishing is contextual, with emails often containing specific information that
would be familiar or important to specific recipients (De Kempe, Walrave, Hardyns, Pauwels & Ponnet,
2018). In order to obtain such information, attackers spend time obtaining private information relevant
to particular users, and then use this information to craft fake emails (Caputo Pfleeger, Freeman, &
Johnson, 2014). These emails tend to impersonate well-known companies, trusted relationships or
contexts that have personal relevance to the individual (De Kempe et al., 2018).
The success of any phishing or spear phishing email is linked to how well it is able to deceive
its recipient. While the research literature has focused on phishing email structure (e.g., use of visual
cues, presence of misspelling or attachments; Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram,
2015), this study explores email contextualization and personalization. Phishing emails containing
personalized information relevant to its recipients have been shown to be effective in deceiving their
targets (Benenson, Gassman & Landwirth, 2016).
Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, and McCormac (2015) tested the effect of different social enginee-
ring strategies by sending a series of genuine, phishing, or spear phishing emails to a group of 117
university students. Overall, the results indicated that students tended to classify emails as genuine
rather than fraudulent and were worse at detecting spear phishing attempts over generic phishing
attempts. It was also found that, where spear phishing emails utilized an authority-style social engi-
neering strategy (i.e., the apparent sender of the email held authority over the reader), students were
less able detect spear-phishing.
Variables Associated with Phishing Risk
Individuals, once aware of their own potential victimization, are thought to become more cautious
or defensive as they navigate risky environments. A national representative survey undertaken in
2017 by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) offers some general insights into how individuals
respond to identify theft, a key predicate offence. The survey found that identity theft was on the rise
with 13.1% of the 9, 947 respondents reporting misuse of personal information in the past 12 months
compared to 8.5% in 2016. The study suggested this was “. . . due to an increase in phishing attacks
and information being obtained by telephone and in face-to-face meetings” (Goldsmid, Gannoni, &
Smith, 2018, p. 59). About two-thirds of the sample perceived that the risk of victimization was likely
to increase, with recent victims more likely to perceive an increased risk and more likely to adopt
security measures such as password changes, signatures, and voice recognition (Goldsmid et al., 2018,
p. 52; 50ff). Understanding the impact of participant ‘priming’ or awareness of potential risk can inform
the development of programs aimed at preventing online victimization.
Participants who are informed that they are being tested on their ability to detect phishing emails
fare better than those who are not informed (Pattinson et al., 2012), although the extent to which
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priming or training assists in preventing victimization has been challenged (Alsharnouby, Alaca, &
Chiasson, 2015; Caputo et al., 2014). In the present study, our subjects were all simply primed as
ethical approval required off-line formal consent and agreement for attempts to deceive them with a
scam email as required by the relevant Australian National University (ANU) Human Research Ethics
Committee (per protocol HREC #2015/038). However, a subsample of our subjects was designated as
‘Hunters,’ and further primed to be more alert than other subjects.
Some studies have found females to be more susceptible to online scams (Iuga, Nurse, & Erola,
2016), and others have found no such connection (Butavicius et al., 2017; Oliviera et al., 2017). The
AIC survey, for example found males and those aged 25-34 years (93.5% of our sample were 25 years
of age or under) were significantly more likely to fall victim to identify theft than females or other
age groups (Goldsmid et al., 2018). Despite these contradictory findings, recent studies have sought to
re-frame the relationship between gender and phishing susceptibility. In Goel, Williams, and Dincelli’s
(2017) study, the act of falling for a phishing scam comprised two steps: first, the opening of a phishing
email, and second, the clicking of the malicious link within. They found that whilst women were more
likely than men to open risky email messages, they were also less likely to click on embedded links,
although differences were not statistically significant.
It is also suggested that technical knowledge and experience improve an individual’s online se-
curity safeguards (Sun et al., 2016). However, the extent that IT competence impacts phishing sus-
ceptibility is still not understood. In their scenario-based role-play experiment, Iuga and colleagues
(2016) examined the relationship between personal computer ‘usage’ and phishing detection by asking
participants to differentiate legitimate web pages from phishing pages. It was found that those who
had been using computers for longer achieved better detection scores.
Pattinson and colleagues (2012) operationalized the notion of computer ‘familiarity’ by combining
the concepts of usage and proficiency and asked their participants how frequently they engage in
certain online activities. This variable was tested for both those that were informed of the experiment
(i.e., primed to phishing attempts) and those that were not (i.e., the control group). For those that were
informed, familiarity correlated significantly with detection rates, and it was determined that those
highly familiar with computers were better at managing phishing emails. This was not the case for the
control group however, suggesting that individuals need to be actively conscious of phishing in order
for their computer familiarity to be relevant.
In both online and offline settings, perceptions of safety alter individual behavior and safety pre-
cautions. The literature has broadly examined the influence of perceptions of Internet safety and phis-
hing vulnerability (e.g., Abassi, Zahedi, & Chen, 2016), however, the relationship between ‘feeling safe
on the Internet’ and the actual risk of deception via a ‘phish’ has not yet been quantified.
Abassi and colleagues’ (2016) study questioned the assumption that those who feel unsafe are
more likely to be vigilant and employ protective countermeasures as this did not necessarily translate
into decreased vulnerability. Their research drew on a sample of 509 university students, staff, and
members of the general public from two cities in the United States. The study categorized individuals
into clusters based on shared online experiences and analyzed their interactions with fake phishing pa-
ges. They found the best detectors of a ‘phish’ were those that were keenly aware of phishing, familiar
with websites, positive about the effectiveness of anti-phishing tools, and had experienced financial
losses due to phishing. However, some of these same traits also negatively affected an individual’s
ability to successfully detect phishing attempts. This was because past encounters and phishing awa-
reness seem to have accentuated an individual’s over-confidence in their ability to detect malicious
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websites, and familiarity with frequented websites induced over-reliance and trust. The study did not
explore how these traits form perceptions of safety, but the results indicate that more robust notions
of Internet risk and vulnerability may assist in phishing avoidance.
More generally, Van Wilsem (2013), drawing from a large household panel study (Longitudinal
Internet Studies for the Social Sciences [LISS]) of Dutch cybercrime victims, suggested that low self-
control (manifested as impulsivity) contributed to online victimisation and was a general risk factor
in victimization online or not. An earlier study, drawing also from the LISS panel, noted the over-
lap between digital and traditional crime showed “. . . the pervasive influence of online activities on
victimization experiences, both on the Internet and in ‘traditional’ life” (Van Wilsem, 2011, p. 125).
The Present Study
Susceptibility is not homogenous amongst Internet users, as a myriad of factors impact indivi-
dual vulnerability, judgment, and online behavior. Accordingly, the present study seeks to determine
the extent the factors set out above influence the risks of cybercrime for students at the ANU. To ac-
complish these goals, participants were exposed to various fake email scams, and their interactions
with these scams were observed. The observation was conducted over a period of nine months (i.e.,
February – November, 2017), during which email content was socially engineered to replicate three
different types of phishing: generic, tailored, and spear phishing. These required emails to be broad
and impersonal, tailored to participants’ institution of study, or highly specific to participants’ own
personal circumstances.
Participants were also compared across two conditions: the ‘Hunter’ condition and the ‘Passive’
condition. In the ‘Hunter’ condition, participants were regularly instructed to be on the lookout for
all forms of cybercrime and report any suspicious content to researchers. This condition primed par-
ticipants to think about the dangers of phishing and was assumed to increase cybercrime awareness.
In the ‘Passive’ condition, no such instructions were received. The number of successful scams (those
that participants were deceived by and referred to as the ‘scam count’), both overall and for each scam
event, provided a measure of susceptibility. Falling for scams was defined as the act of clicking on the
fake links provided in the emails. A small pilot study was conducted over several months in 2016 to
understand the responses of the ANU Information Security system and involved a sample of 61 stu-
dents who were recruited to help test various ‘spoof ’ emails. Drawing from the results of the pilot and
the literature several hypotheses were tested:
H1: Scam susceptibility increases as emails became increasingly tailored to the individual. That
is, participants were expected to be more likely to be deceived by spear phishing emails then
tailored emails, and tailored emails more than generic emails.
H2: Scam susceptibility varies as a function of cybercrime awareness. The scam count was expec-
ted to be lower for Hunter participants, who were primed to remain vigilant for cybercrime.
(Note, however, in this study all participants were informed that they were going to receive
scam emails, and so the “Hunter” role was a reinforcement rather than a ‘primer’ or awareness
stimulus.)
H3: An association between gender and scam susceptibility: females were expected to exhibit higher
scam susceptibility than males.
H4: An association between IT competence and scam susceptibility: participants with lower IT com-
petence were expected to exhibit higher scam susceptibility.
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H5: An association between perceived Internet safety and scam susceptibility: feeling safe may in-
crease susceptibility.
Method
Participants
Table 1. Characteristics of Sample
Characteristic Participant
(N=138)
Gender %
Male 50
Female 49.3
Other 0.7
Age
Under21 64.5
21 - 25 29
26 - 30 3.6
>30 2.9
Student Status:
Domestic 83.8
International 16.2
Residential Status
Home 45.6
On Campus 38.2
Other 16.2
Faculty/Study
Science 29.0
Arts/Social Sciences 25.4
Commerce/Economics 13.8
Science/Engineering 12.3
Law 11.6
Asia Pacific Studies 5.1
Other 1.4
Medicine 0.7
Administration 0.7
Year of Study
1 Year 53.6
2 Years 17.4
3 Years 11.6
4 Years 11.6
>4 Years 5.8
One hundred and forty-four students from ANU (73 males, 70 females, 1 other) were recruited for
this study, and most (53.6%) were commencing their first year of study. Recruitment occurred during
orientation week. Students either signed up at a stall belonging to the ANU Criminology Society, or
upon being approached by researchers on campus. All participants provided informed, written consent
prior to their participation in the study as required by the relevant ANU ethics protocol. Those who
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completed the post observational survey received a free hamburger voucher from a popular store as an
incentive to complete the follow-up survey.
Data analysis was conducted on a final sample of 138 participants after excluding several due to
indecipherable personal details and/or incomplete survey responses. General demographic data, and
attitudes to the Internet were obtained from participants via a pre-test and follow-up survey. We asked
about gender, age, student (domestic or international) and residential status (home, residential college,
other), year of study, and study discipline (course or degree enrolled). An Internet safety component
included questions about overall IT competence (54.3% thought they were above average or advanced),
social media access (95.7% used social media daily), past experiences with cybercrime (nine respon-
dents reported being a victim of cybercrime), self-reported ability to spot Internet scams (89.8% agreed
or strongly agreed that the could detect scams), and feelings about Internet-related safety (87.6% re-
ported being safe or somewhat safe). To reduce respondent burden during field recruitment, the survey
format was limited to a single question for each potential variable. The face-to-face consent and pre-
observation survey were designed to be completed in less than ten minutes.
Upon finishing the experimental phase, participants were asked to complete a second survey. This
involved responding to the same questions as the Internet safety component of the pre-test survey. In
addition, participants were asked if they had fallen for any fake scams, whether the study impac-
ted their perceived risk and awareness of cybercrime, and how participating in the study influenced
Internet-related behaviors. This information was collected for the purpose of comparing participants’
responses at the beginning of the study (Time 1) with their responses at the end of the study (Time 2)
and examining the impact of the study on participants’ Internet-related attitudes and behaviors.
Software, materials and data recording
This experiment required the re-design of different elements of available software. We needed to
manage the creation and distribution of the phishing emails, and design a method for recording data
about the interaction participants had with the fake phishing emails. In addition a service that hosted
a number of different web sites (copies of legitimate web services) that our participants could visit if
deceived by the fake phishing emails. We developed our own software system to enable:
• Use of the university’s mail-server to spoof originating email addresses.
• Record of when emails were sent, when they were opened (in some cases), when the participant
clicked on one of our fake or ‘dodgy’ hyperlinks, and when they then entered their credentials
into the fake website.
• Web based software to send and monitor these fake emails.
The research team set up a web server that ran an industry standard web server configuration (a
LAMP stack) made up of an Apache web server, a MySQL database, and both Python and PHP scrip-
ting languages. A framework for sending emails and recording participant responses to those emails
was developed using standard scripting languages. The emails were crafted to appear to have been
sent by a (fake) person or organization. In order to distribute these ‘spoofed’ emails, access to an open
SMTP server is required. To send these emails, the script would connect to the SMTP server and send
the email data. This data includes the sender’s email address. Email clients, such as Hotmail, Gmail,
and Outlook, include the sender’s email address in the emails that they send, however the SMTP
standard does not require the correct originating email address. This weakness allows cybercriminals
to send emails that appear to have originated from other people or organizations.
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, Page. 4-23, Publication date: February 2019.
10
Phishing and Cybercrime Risks Broadhurst et al.
During the observation phase, emails were sent to our participants containing a link to a falsified
’Login Page.’ The login page was a copy of the university website’s student portal login page and, was
hosted on the server used in this study. All data was transmitted and received between the server
and the participant. Each participant was assigned a unique identifier and every phish email that was
sent to a participant contained this unique identifier, allowing any actions taken by participants in
response to the phish to be recorded. Three different types of responses were recorded:
• No response. The email never got past the spam filters into the participant’s inbox (however, see
below regarding web beacon de-activation and non-response ambiguity).
• Received but ignored. The participant opened the email, but chose not to take any action. This
may or may not be because they identified the email as fraudulent.
• Received and responded. The participant takes action in response. This could be sending an
email in reply, clicking on a link within the email, and/or completing a web form as a result of
clicking a link. We did not include downloading and opening an attachment in this study due to
the enhanced security associated with spoofing attachments.
The study was not able to use the university Internet Service Provider’s service to create a ‘white
list’ for tracking the students participating in the study and alternative means of monitoring had to
be devised. We duplicated the login screens of a number of ANU web services, including the email
system and the student online management services. They were designed to record the time, date
and IP address of each access by our participants, as well as whether or not the participant then
proceeded to log into the fake website. We also tracked when a recipient had opened an email by
embedding a hidden web beacon into the content of the email. The beacon or website monitor and
attached ‘cookies’ made contact with the study web server every time the email was rendered on a
participant’s computer screen, and a record was made of the date and time of the contact, and of the
IP address of the participant’s computer.
It was not straightforward to track when a participant opened an email to read. Techniques such
as using a web beacon are well known amongst spammers. The presence of a web beacon, or similar
tool, triggers the spam filters employed by many email providers. It is also possible that the web beacon
failed to connect to the study web server due to the presence of beacon and/or cookie de-activation
software. Moreover, many email clients disable the automatic loading of content when an email is
opened. Without this automatic load, the web beacon is unable to signal to the server that the email
has been read. Due to this, it was not possible to track emails which had been received but ignored. In
this circumstance we are unable to identify if the email was actually read by the participant. Thus, the
absence of a record is not conclusive evidence that a participant did not open one of our spoof emails.
The data counts are thus conservative.
Operationalizing Scam Susceptibility
The number of fake scams that successfully deceived recipients operationalized scam susceptibi-
lity. Scam content was varied across three levels of specificity or individualization via nine fake emails
that tested participants’ susceptibility:
Generic: the content of fake scams was not personally relevant to participants and replicated
real world mass scams. Three common emails were sent, with two of these displaying a ‘Mailbox Full’
notification and the other alerting the receiver to ‘Unread Messages.’
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Tailored: the content of fake scams at this level related to the ANU. While these emails were
not specific to the individual, they were tailored to the institution and thus provided a mid-point of
specificity between generic and spear phishing emails. Four mails purporting to be from ANU’s Student
Administration included: a notice about changes to the ‘Exam Timetable,’ an email about a refund from
the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) with subject heading ‘HECS Overcharge,’ an email
about ‘Semester 1 Results,’ and an email requesting an update of the students record on the Interactive
Student Information System (ISIS) with subject heading ‘Outdated ISIS Details’ (see example below).
Spear-phishing: fake content was made to be personally relevant to the individual. Spear phishers
take time and effort to understand their targets in order to maximize the perceived legitimacy of their
emails. Such emails may relate not only to relevant institutions, but also to the individual’s personal
and social lives. Two individual crafted spear phishing mails were sent to a sub-set of participants for
whom sufficient personal information was found online. Examples of the scam emails used for each
level of specificity are provided below.
Generic Email
Mailbox Full: Upgrade Now
Hi,
Your mailbox is currently at capacity and you are eligible for a free upgrade. Click here to upgrade.
Thanks,
The Outlook Team
Tailored Email
Final Examination Timetable: Update
***This is an automatically generated email from an unattended email account; please do not reply***
Student ID:
Name:
Dear (insert name),
IMPORTANT: There have been changes to the final examination timetable. Please disregard previous email sent on Friday
28 April 2017.
To access your examination timetable login to ISIS and select ’My Timetable’ from the menu on the left.
The examination timetable can be viewed at: https://exams.anu.edu.au/timetable/
Further general information about examinations is available at: http://www.anu.edu.au/students/program-administrati
on/assessments-exams/examination-conduct and http://www.anu.edu.au/students/program-administration/assessm
ents-exams/examination-timetable. For noting, all examinations are taking place on Acton campus [see campus map at
http://www.anu.edu.au/maps\#] or at 7-11 Barry Drive, Turner, ACT, 2612 [see map at http://quicklink.anu.edu.au/xni6]
Spear Phish Email
From: ANU Sport <sport@anu.edu.au>
Subject: Sportsperson of the Year – Nominated
Good afternoon <participant name>,
Congratulations! We are delighted to let you know that someone has nominated you for the following award: ANU Sportsperson
of the Year 2016-17.
We heard that you competed in the Pacific Athletics Championships mid last year. This is an amazing feat that should be cele-
brated.
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If you are interested in officially entering as a nominee, please follow the link and enter your details:
<Link to fake ANU Sportsperson of the Year Nomination form that requires the following: First name, surname, and email
address, mailing address, phone number, ANU student number>
Best,
Mike Brody
Chief Executive Officer - ANU Sport
Procedure
The observational phase occurred over a period of several months. Prior to participation, all par-
ticipants read an information sheet detailing the study. The voluntary nature of their participation
was emphasized, and a consent form was signed (per ANU Ethics Protocol #2015/038). Participants
completed the general demographic and Internet safety questionnaire and provided their university
identification and email address. Two months after signing up, participants were emailed a reminder
that they were part of the study and an opportunity to opt out prior to commencement was provided.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (Hunter vs. Passive group). Hunters
were asked every 4-6 weeks via email to remain constantly vigilant for both fake and real forms of
cybercrime, and to forward all suspicious content to the researchers.
Personal information about each participant was extracted, if possible, from their Facebook and
LinkedIn profiles, in order to create content for the spear phishing emails. These social media sites
provided information about age, current and previous jobs, social relationships, religious and political
preferences, hobbies and interests, club memberships and affiliations, and frequently visited locations.
After extracting and documenting personal information, a tailored, personally relevant fake attack was
created for each participant. For example, searching the Facebook profile of one participant revealed
that they had competed in the 2016 Pacific Athletics Championships (a pseudonym). This information
allowed for an email impersonating ANU Sport to be created (see above). All spear phishing emails
were created in a similar manner and varied depending on the online personal information available.
Personal information could not be collected for all participants due to an absence of a social media
presence or restricted privacy settings. Specialized emails were created for only 25 participants with
adequate online information.
During the observation phase, participants received between seven and nine fake email scams
(depending on whether they could be spear phished). All emails attempted to elicit personal informa-
tion from participants (e.g., university login and password), or attempted to entice participants to click
on a fake compromised link. Participants who clicked links or attempted to login to fake pages were
redirected to a landing page informing them that they had fallen for a fake attack and reminding them
to be more vigilant in future (see Appendix 1).
Results
We first separately examined the effects of the different scam types used, namely Generic, Tail-
ored and Spear Phishing. Altogether three generic and four tailored scams were randomly sent to 138
subjects and two ‘spear’ or individualized scams were sent to 25 subjects for whom sufficient perso-
nal data was obtained from open sources such as Facebook. The total numbers of scams are compiled
for each category and we obtain the proportion by normalizing or adjusting the total count by both
the number of subjects and number of scams in each category. Participants were most susceptible to
a scam with the heading “Final Examination Timetable: Update,” which was a scam tailored to the
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participants’ university study. Participants were almost equally susceptible to a generic scam titled
“Messages.” Figure 1 shows the number of participants who fell for each scam by gender and the num-
ber of successful scams by gender is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Number of participants deceived by gender, ordered by scam counts.
Notes: The sample for spear phish attempts is 25 and 135 participants (after removing ‘other’ gender and missing values) for all other scams.
Following the scam type, we indicate the level of specificity by G = generic, T = tailored and distinguished from a ‘spear phish’. We note the order
of a scam delivery in the observation timeline by 1<2<3<4, where ‘1’ is earlier than ‘2’, which is earlier than ‘3’. For example, ‘Exam Timetable
(T1)’ is a scam notifying changes to the exam table that was the first of the tailored scams received by participants.
Overall, there appeared to be an increasing trend in relation to the scam type and scam suscep-
tibility in the normalized proportions in Table 2 with increasing ‘success’ for more individualized and
tailored scams. However, a Wilcoxon signed rank test showed these proportions do not differ signifi-
cantly but the comparison between generic and tailored approached significance (p = 0.093, W= 2785).
Note that a chi-square test is not appropriate for this comparison because Table 2 is not a contingency
table and the adjusted proportions do not sum to 1. A t-test is also not adequate for this pair-wise com-
parison due to the discrete nature of scam counts. Low numbers (n=25) for the spear phishing sample
significantly reduces the power of the Wilcoxon signed rank test when paired with the corresponding
generic and tailored group.
To test the effects of various variables of interest listed in Hypotheses 2 to 5, we fitted a Genera-
lized Linear Model (GLM) with a Poisson error distribution and log link to the response variable total
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Figure 2: Number of participants fallen for no scams, 1 scam or more by gender.
scam count as a measure of scam susceptibility. Allowance was made for the fact that only 25 subjects
received individualized spear phishing emails. We defined an offset of log(7) or log(9) for each subject
depending on the total number of scams they were exposed to. Explanatory variables included in this
model (Model 1) were the initial hypothesis variables: Gender, IT Competence, Cybercrime Awareness,
(the Hunter vs. Passive condition), and Perceived Internet Safety. The likelihood ratio test of Model 1
against the null model gave a non-significant p-value of 0.17.
Table 2. Scam type by number of successful deceptions
Scam type Generic Tailored Spear phishing
Total count 113 165 17
Adjusted proportion 0.27 0.30 0.34
In a further analysis of other variables of interest, the best model is obtained from a stepwise
variable selection procedure, which includes only Years of Study (first year university student and later
years) and Student Status (international or domestic students) with no significant interaction effect.
We call this Model 2. Adding in the hypothesis variables included in Model 1 to Model 2 produced
no significant change (p > .35). In Model 2, both variables are significant with p-value .012 for Years
of Study and p-value 0.017 for Student Status respectively (see Appendix 2 for details of the GLM
analysis).
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Table 3. Survey responses pre (T1) and post (T2)
Question Response at Response at
Percent(%) T1 (N=138) T2 (N=85)
Use Social Media Daily: 95.7 96.5
Use Facebook 94.7 96.5
Use Instagram 51.9 69.4
Use Snapchat 46.6 76.5
Use Google+ 7.6 18.8
Use Twitter 6.9 30.6
Use Tumblr 6.1 18.8
Use LinkedIn 4.6 23.5
Use Other 3.1 15.5
IT Competence(%):
Poor 8.7 3.5
Adequate 37.0 28.2
Above Average 44.2 48.2
Advanced 10.1 20.0
Cybercrime Victim 6.5 4.7
Can spot cybercrime
Strongly Disagree 3.6 0.0
Disagree 6.5 4.7
Agree 65.2 71.8
Strongly Agree 24.6 23.5
Purchase Online Goods
Never 3.6 2.4
Rarely 16.7 21.2
Sometimes 51.4 51.8
Frequently 28.3 24.8
Internet Safety
Very Unsafe 0.7 1.2
Somewhat Unsafe 11.6 10.6
Somewhat Safe 71.7 71.8
Very Safe 15.9 16.5
aAverage response between T1 and T2 were significantly diffe-
rent (t84 = -2.689, p < .01). On average, people had lower self-
reported IT competence before the study.
The mean scam count was found to differ significantly between domestic and international stu-
dents (t = -3.2749, p < .003). A greater number of international students fell for 3 or more scams than
domestic students. Similarly, the mean scam count differed significantly between first and later year
students (t = 3.1724, p < .002).
A Fisher’s Exact Test was used as low cell counts were observed in cross-tabulations between some
of the variables investigated. Self-reported IT competence was found to significantly differ by gender
(Fisher’s Exact Test p < .001, φp = .38). More males rated their IT competence as above average or
advanced, while more females reported having only poor or adequate IT competence. Males were also
significantly more likely than females to self-report an ability to spot fake scams (Fisher’s Exact Test p
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< .05, φp = .30). Scam susceptibility, however, was not associated with IT competence nor was it found
to significantly differ by perceptions of Internet safety.
Responses to the Internet survey at time 1 (before the observations) and time 2, are reported
below in Table 3, however, only 62% of the respondents completed the follow-up survey, limiting the
reliability of pre- and post-study differences. Participants rated their IT competence more highly post-
study but perceptions of online safety remained largely unchanged although overall there was more
diversity in the use of social media.
Discussion
The literature generally suggests that the specificity of a scam may influence cybercrime suscep-
tibility. That is, individuals are more likely to be deceived by scams that are tailored to their personal
circumstances compared to those with generic content. To determine whether participants were more
susceptible to spear phishing attacks than generic attacks, we used three different scam types: generic,
tailored, and spear phishing. Results revealed no significant relationship between scam type and scam
susceptibility. However, the email content that deceived most participants provided insight into the
types of scams that may succeed. The most successful attack related to an urgent email sent during
the exam period about the participants’ final exam timetable. This email likely succeeded because it
was both relevant and salient, and instilled fear in participants as the email required urgent changes
by participants.
The hypothesis that scam susceptibility would vary as a function of awareness about cybercrime
was not supported. Despite participants in the Hunter condition being primed to remain vigilant for
cybercrime, this did not reduce scam susceptibility. Over several months, Hunters received four emails
reminding them about the dangers of cybercrime and prompting them to remain vigilant but only
one ‘hunter’ reported a single suspicious email. This kind of general prompt may have been too weak
to raise cybercrime awareness, and thus created minimal differences in awareness between Hunter
and Passive conditions. The ineffectual prompting apparent in the present study suggests that increa-
sing the public’s level of cybercrime awareness would require constant effort and specific rather than
general prompts or warnings about cybercrime.
The gender, IT competence, and perceived Internet safety hypotheses were also not supported. In
line with more recent studies (e.g. Butavicius et al. 2017) results from the present study revealed no
significant differences in scam susceptibility between male and female participants, low IT competence
and high IT competence participants, or participants who rated the Internet as a safe versus unsafe
place. This sample was perhaps too small and/or atypical to detect differences even if significant relati-
onships between gender, IT competence, feelings of Internet safety, and cybercrime susceptibility have
been identified in other studies (e.g. Iuga et al., 2016; Halevi, Memon, & Oded, 2015).
While none of the initial hypotheses were supported, post-hoc analyses revealed that internati-
onal students were significantly more susceptible to email scams than domestic students. Although
the nature of this relationship is unclear, it is theorized that international students were possibly dis-
advantaged by language barriers, and/or had different experiences with cybercrime in their countries
of origin. Similarly, first year students were significantly more susceptible to email scams than la-
ter year students. This may be due to a multitude of factors including age, cybercrime experience, or
overall confidence. Perhaps later year students had experienced more real-world scams or may have
been more confident in navigating the university email systems compared to first year students. Like
international students, first year students were more at risk of cybercrime, suggesting that awareness
measures targeted to new and international students would be beneficial. More broadly, exploring the
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influence of age and experience on scam susceptibility would allow the nature of this relationship to be
better understood. A lack of age variability in the present study prevented this from being examined.
Conclusion
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this small exploratory study. Firstly, the expe-
rimental manipulation (Passive versus Hunter) may not have adequately distinguished levels of cy-
bercrime awareness. It remains important that future research explores how phishing and cybercrime
awareness impacts susceptibility to scams.
Secondly, the ability to observe whether emails were actually opened and read was not always
feasible, often due to the action of web beacons. Consequently, it was unknown during the initial phase
of the study whether participants were actively identifying the emails as attacks or simply ignoring
them. Opening an email and identifying it as a scam is different from ignoring the content entirely;
however, the inability to distinguish between these actions meant that participants who ignored the
emails altogether were also treated as less susceptible to fake scams. Therefore, our interpretation of
non-response was conditional because it was not always possible to distinguish between an unread or
unopened email. Our observation is thus limited to what action our respondents took, if any, in respect
to the response demand of the phish.
Finally, the present study did not account for practice effects. The second of our generic ‘Mailbox
Full’ scams deceived (n=16) half as many participants than the first round (n=34) suggesting that a
practice effect may be in play. Each time a participant was deceived by our fake phishing mail they
were directed to a web-landing page (see Appendix 1). This informed them that they had been deceived
and offered cyber-safety advice. Thus repeated practice with phishing emails may have overshadowed
the influence of different scam types. While results did not reveal an overall decrease in susceptibility
over time, it would have helped to distinguish between the effects of scam types and the role of practice.
This would have allowed results to be attributed confidently to the experimental manipulation of scam
type and could have shed light on whether repeated exposure to fake scams increased cybercrime
awareness and decreased cybercrime susceptibility. Observing the presence of practice effects could
provide information about how to teach and increase cybercrime awareness (see Canfield, Fischhoff, &
Davis, 2016).
Future research could apply a more robust quasi-experimental design to determine the variables
that influence scam susceptibility. Understanding the factors that influence susceptibility will help
to protect against phishing and other forms of cybercrime. While the present study was exploratory,
our attempt to observe cybercrime victimization in a real-world setting may be scaled up with larger
samples and a greater variety of social engineering methods.
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Appendix 1: Landing Page
Oops! This was a test from the ANU Cybercrime Observatory
Experiment “Wi-Fi Usage and Cybercrime Risks in University
Student Communities”.
We are testing participants’ susceptibility to spear phishing and
scam/spam attempts.
This notification indicates that you have fallen for a FAKE
spam/phishing attempt. Don’t worry, as this was not a legitimate
spam/phishing attempt any identifying information you may have
provided is not compromised. Your participation in this study is of
great value for our research as we attempt to identify where our on-
line vulnerabilities lie and how we can protect ourselves.
PLEASE NOTE: during this research phase you may in fact be expo-
sed to ‘real’ scams/spam/phishing attempts. Remain vigilant and be
careful about your online activity.
For useful cyber safety information visit http://dmm.anu.edu.au/7JPtR cybersafety/package.php
For queries regarding the study you are welcome to contact roderic.broadhurst@anu.edu.auorcyberobs.
anu@gmail.com with the subject line as “Queries about Wi-Fi usage study (protocol number: 2015/038)”
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Appendix 2: GLM Results
The analysis is performed with R version 3.5.1 (2018-07-02). Three participants with missing
values are omitted from the GLM analysis, one of them had indicated Gender as ‘Others’ and two
others have missing Student Status. All variables included in Model 1 are listed below:
• Yi represents the number of scams the ith individual has fallen for: 0-7;
• X1i is the indicator of the ith individual’s gender: male or female;
• X2i represents the ith individual’s IT competence: Poor < Ave. < Above Ave. < Advance;
• X3i is the indicator of the ith individual’s Cybercrime Awareness: Hunter or Passive;
• X4i represents the ith individual’s perceived internet safety: Very Unsafe < Somewhat Unsafe
< Somewhat safe < Very safe;
• Offseti adjusts for the total number of scams the ith individual is exposed to: log(7) or log(9).
Model 1 regression equation
log(E(Yi)) = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + β4X4i + offseti
Table 2.1: Analysis of deviance table of Model 1*
Residual df Residual Additional Change in p-value
deviance df deviance
Null model 134 154.48
Model 1 126 142.78 8 11.696 0.1653
∗Note: Analysis of deviance table for Model 1 compared to the null model where only
the intercept is fitted with the offset; note df = degree of freedom.
The likelihood ratio test of Model 1 against the null model where only the intercept is fitted gives a
p-value of 0.1653. Thus, there are no significant effects overall in Model 1. Post-hoc analysis identified
two additional variables that are highly correlated to scam count, they are
• W1i is the ith individual’s year of study: Year 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (treated as numeric);
• W2i is the indicator of the ith individual’s residential status: domestic or international.
Both forward and backward stepwise variable selection procedures are performed on all variables
mentioned above based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The final best model we call Model
2 and is described next (see below).
Model 2 regression equation
log(E(Yi)) = β0 + β1W1i + β2W2i + offseti
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Table 2.2: Analysis of deviance table of Model 2*
Residual Residual Additional Change in p-value
df Deviance df Deviance
Null model 134 154.48
Model 2 132 136.68 2 17.7918 0.0001369
Full model 124 127.86 8 8.8271 0.3570867
Note∗: Analysis of deviance table for Model 2 compared to the null model and the full
model where all hypothesis variables are included.
Table 2.3: Summary of coefficients in Model 2*
Estimate Standard Error Z-value p-value
intercept(β0) -1.0351 0.1250 -8.282 0
years of study(β1) -0.1381 0.0549 -2.516 0.0119
status: international(β2) 0.3453 0.1447 2.387 0.0170
∗Both variables in Model 2 are significant at 0.05 level.
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